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Abstract
We consider the problem of the optimization
of bidding strategies in prior-dependent revenue-
maximizing auctions, when the seller fixes the
reserve prices based on the bid distributions. Our
study is done in the setting where one bidder
is strategic. Using a variational approach, we
study the complexity of the original objective and
we introduce a relaxation of the objective func-
tional in order to use gradient descent methods.
Our approach is simple, general and can be ap-
plied to various value distributions and revenue-
maximizing mechanisms. The new strategies we
derive yield massive uplifts compared to the tradi-
tional truthfully bidding strategy.
1. Introduction
Modern marketplaces like Uber, Amazon or Ebay enable
sellers to fine-tune their selling mechanism by reusing their
large number of past interactions with consumers. In the
online advertising or the electricity markets, billions of auc-
tions are occurring everyday between the same bidders and
sellers. Based on the data gathered, different approaches
learn complex mechanisms maximizing the seller revenue
(Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002; Ostrovsky and Schwarz,
2011; Paes Leme et al., 2016; Golrezaei et al., 2017).
Most of the literature has focused on the auctioneer side
(Milgrom and Tadelis, 2018). Algorithms focused on the
bidder’s standpoint to enable them to be strategic against any
smart data-driven selling mechanisms are lacking. These
algorithms should ideally strengthen the balance of power
driving the relationship between buyers and sellers. Our
main objective is to exhibit simple robust algorithmic proce-
dures that take advantage of various data-dependent revenue-
maximizing mechanisms. This represents a big step forward
in understanding possible strategic behaviors in revenue
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maximizing auctions. This is a new argument support-
ing the Wilson doctrine (Wilson, 1987) claiming that data-
dependent revenue maximizing algorithms are not robust to
strategic bidders.
1.1. Framework
In the early stage of the market design literature (see, e.g.,
Myerson (1981)), a typical underlying assumption is that
the bidders’ value distributions were commonly known to
the seller and other bidders. This can be justified if differ-
ent group of bidders with the same value distribution are
interacting successively with one seller. In the aforemen-
tioned modern applications, the same bidders have billions
of interactions everyday with the seller. Even if the latter
does not know the value distribution beforehand, it might
use in many cases the past bid distributions as proxies of
value distribution.
Several mechanisms based on the value distribution of bid-
ders have already been introduced. We will focus on the
lazy second price auction with personalized reserve price
(Paes Leme et al., 2016), the Myerson auction (Myerson,
1981), the eager version of the second price auction and the
boosted second price auction (Golrezaei et al., 2017). When
repeating these auctions (every day, or every milli-second,
depending on the context) and if the bidder is myopic, i.e
optimizing per stage and not long-term revenue, it is optimal
to bid truthfully at each auction. So with myopic bidders,
bids and values have the same distribution and the seller can
design optimally the mechanism based on the former.
Non-myopic bidders optimize their long-term expected util-
ity taking into account that their current strategy will imply
a certain mechanism (for instance a specific reserve price)
in the future. More precisely, we will consider the following
steady state analysis. Assume the valuations of a bidder
vi ∈ R are drawn from a specific distribution Fi; a bidding
strategy is a mapping βi from R into R that indicates the
actual bid Bi = βi(vi) when the value is vi. As a conse-
quence, the distribution of bids FBi is the push-forward of
Fi by βi. In the steady state, the seller uses the distribu-
tions of bids FBi to choose a specific auction mechanism
M(FBi) among a given class of mechanismsM. The ob-
jective of a long-term strategic bidder is to find her strategy
βi that maximizes her expected utility when vi ∼ Fi, she
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bids βi(vi) and the induced mechanism isM(FBi). This
steady-state objective is particularly relevant in modern ap-
plications as most of the data-driven selling mechanisms
are using large batches of bids as examples to update their
mechanism.
In terms of game theory, these interactions are a game be-
tween the seller - whose strategy is to pick a mechanism
design that maps bid distributions to reserve prices - and
the bidders - who chose bidding strategies. Our overarching
objective is to derive the best-response, for a given bidder i,
to the strategy of the seller (i.e., a given mechanism) and the
strategies of the other bidders (i.e., their bid distributions).
1.2. Contributions
Our main contributions are the following. We first intro-
duce the optimization problem that strategic bidders are
facing when the seller is optimizing personalized reserve
prices based on their bid distributions. A straightforward
optimization can fail because the objective is discontinuous
as a function of the bidding strategy.
To circumvent this issue, we introduce a new relaxation of
the problem which is stable to local perturbations of the ob-
jective function and computationally tractable and efficient.
We numerically optimize this new objective through a sim-
ple neural network and get very significant improvements in
bidder utility compared to truthful bidding. We also provide
a theoretical analysis of thresholded strategies (introduced
in Nedelec et al. (2018)) and show their (local) optimality as
improvements of bidding strategies with non-zero reserve
value.
For the Myerson auction, the strategies learned by the model
can be independently proved to be optimal. We apply the
approach to other auction settings such as boosted second
price or eager second price with monopoly price. We report
massive uplifts compared to the traditional truthful strategy
advocated in all these settings. Our simple approach can be
plugged in any modern bidding algorithms learning distribu-
tion of the highest bid of the competition and we test it on
other classes of mechanism without any known closed form
optimal bidding strategies. We finally provide the code in
PyTorch that has been used to run the different experiments.
This approach opens avenues of research for designing good
bidding strategies in many data-driven revenue-maximizing
auctions.
1.3. Related work
Starting with the seminal work of Myerson (1981), a rich
line of work indicates the type of auctions that is revenue-
maximizing for the seller. In the case of symmetric bidders
(Myerson, 1981), one revenue maximizing auction is a sec-
ond price auction with a reserve price equal to the monopoly
price, i.e, the price r that maximizes r(1−F (r)). However,
in most applications, the symmetric assumption is not sat-
isfied (Golrezaei et al., 2017). In the asymmetric case, the
Myerson auction is optimal (Myerson, 1981) but is difficult
to implement in practice (Morgenstern and Roughgarden,
2015). In this case, a second price auction with a well-
chosen vector of reserve prices guarantees at least one-half
of the optimal revenue (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009).
In modern markets, some bidders are myopic simply be-
cause truthful bidding is a simple strategy to implement.
Receiving truthful bid enables sellers to design various rev-
enue maximizing auctions. (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002)
has therefore been interested in the automatic mechanism
design that fine tunes mechanism based on some examples
of bids. This work was extended recently in (Du¨tting et al.,
2017) with the use of deep learning. In (Ostrovsky and
Schwarz, 2011; Medina and Mohri, 2014; Paes Leme et al.,
2016), it is shown specifically how to learn the optimal
reserve prices in the lazy second price auction. This prac-
tice was theoretically addressed by (Cole and Roughgarden,
2014; Huang et al., 2018; Devanur et al., 2016) looking at
the sample complexity of a large class of auctions assuming
an oracle offering iid examples of the value distribution.
However, it is quite intuitive that non-myopic bidders should
not bid truthfully. Robustness to strategic bidders has been
studied in (Balseiro et al., 2017; Kanoria and Nazerzadeh,
2014; Epasto et al., 2018). A potential limitation of this type
of approach is that it is either assumed that all bidders have
the same value distribution (or up to ε for some specific
metric on distributions) or that there is a very large number
of bidders and a global mechanism designed so that any of
them has no incentive to bid untruthfully. In (Ashlagi et al.,
2016), an involved mechanism was designed that keeps the
incentive compatibility property even if the seller is learning
on former bids of the bidders.
None of these papers have exhibited optimal strategies that
can be used when the seller is optimizing her mechanism
based on past bids. This strategic behavior has been studied
for posted price with one bidder and one seller (Mohri and
Munoz, 2015). An independent line of work has focused on
learning to bid when the value is not known to the bidders
(Weed et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2018). Some Bayes-Nash
equilibria corresponding to games where bidders can choose
their bid distribution were designed (Tang and Zeng, 2018;
Abeille et al., 2018) with some derivations of seller revenue
and bidders utility at these equilibria. However, no strate-
gies corresponding to these equilibria were provided in the
general case. Our work is finally strongly related to (Ned-
elec et al., 2018) where a new class of shading strategies for
second price auctions with personalized reserve price is pro-
posed. Our new optimization pipeline is very general and
enables bidders to learn good bidding strategies in multiple
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settings and for any value distribution.
2. The bidder’s optimization problem
We introduce in this section the optimization problem, start-
ing with the lazy second price auction with personalized
reserve prices (formalized below).
2.1. Notations and setting
To describe precisely our approach, we use the traditional
setting of auction theory (see e.g. Krishna (2009)). Recall
that Fi is the value distribution of bidder i and βi : R→ R
her strategy that maps values to bids. The corresponding
distribution of bids is then FBi = βi]Fi, the push-forward
of Fi w.r.t. βi. In the steady-state, we assume that the seller
has the perfect knowledge of each bid distribution FBi .
Notice that we have implicitly identified the distribution
Fi (resp. FBi ) with its cumulative distribution function (cdf)
and use both terms exchangeably. We use fi (resp. fBi ) for
the corresponding probability density function (pdf).
For the sake of simplicity, let us first consider a lazy second
price auction Krishna (2009). We recall that in this auction
each bidder has a personalized reserve price. The item is
attributed to the highest bidder, if she clears her reserve
price, and not attributed otherwise; the winner then pays the
maximum between the second highest bid and her reserve
price. It is known that the optimal reserve price of bidder
i is her monopoly price equal to argmaxr r(1 − FBi(r)),
or equivalently1 to ψ−1Bi (0), where ψBi is the usual virtual
value function defined as
ψBi(b) = b−
1− FBi(b)
fBi(b)
.
As a consequence, it is natural to assume that the strategy of
bidder i does not impact the strategy of other bidders (that
can be either myopic or not) and from now on, we assume
that bids are independent.
2.2. A variational approach
A fundamental result in auction theory is the Myerson
lemma (Myerson, 1981). It expresses the expected pay-
ment of a bidder depending on her virtual value and the
value distribution of the competition. An important nota-
tion is Gi, the cdf of the maximum bid of players other
than i; obviously, if the other bidders are truthful, Gi is the
distribution of the maximum value of the other bidders.
Lemma 1 (Integrated version of the Myerson lemma). In a
lazy second price auction with personalized reserve price
1at least for regular distributions, i.e., when ψ is non-decreasing
ri, the payment of bidder i with continuous strategy βi is
Π(βi) = EBi∼FBi
(
ψBi(Bi)Gi(Bi)1(Bi ≥ ri)
)
.
Proof. The proof is similar to the original one (Myerson,
1981), see also (Krishna, 2009), so we do not spell it out. It
consists of using Fubini’s theorem and integration by parts
to transform the standard form of the seller revenue, i.e.
EBi∼FBi ,Xj∼FBj
(
max
j 6=i
(Bj , r)1[Bi≥maxj 6=i(Bj ,r)]
)
into the above equation. It then suffices to work along
the lines mentioned above with Yi = maxj 6=iBj and
realize that i’s expected payment can be written as
EBi∼FBi ,Yi∼Gi
(
max(Yi, r)1[Bi≥max(Yi,r)]
)
.
In lazy second price auction, the seller chooses as reserve
price the monopoly price corresponding to the bid distri-
bution of bidder i. In this case, Lemma 1 implies that the
expected payment of bidder i is equal to
Π(βi) = EB∼FBi
(
ψBi(B)Gi(B)1(B ≥ ψ−1Bi (0))
)
.
In order to simplify the computation of the expectation and
remove the dependence on βi, this expected payment can
be rewritten in the space of values, by introducing
hβi(x) , ψFBi (βi(x)) ,
and noting the equivalent following formulation
Π(βi) = EXi∼Fi
(
hβi(Xi)Gi(βi(Xi))1(Xi ≥ xβi)
)
,
where xβi = h
−1
βi
(0) when hβi is increasing. We call it the
reserve value, as it is the smallest value above which the
seller accepts all bids from bidder i.
The expected utility can be derived as a function of βi as
U(βi) = EXi∼Fi
(
(Xi−hβi(Xi))Gi(β(Xi))1(Xi ≥ xβi)
)
.
(1)
Finally, we remark that if βi is increasing and differentiable,
hβi verifies a simple first order differential equation.
Lemma 2. Suppose βi is increasing and differentiable then
hβi(xi) = ψFBi (βi(x)) = βi(x)− β′i(x)
1− Fi(x)
fi(x)
. (2)
Proof. ψFBi (b) = b−
1−FBi (b)
fBi (b)
with FBi(b) = Fi(β
−1
i (b))
and fBi(b) = fi(β
−1
i (b)/β
′
i(β
−1
i (b). Then, hβi(x) =
ψBi(βi(x)) = βi(X)− β′i(X) 1−Fi(X)fi(X) .
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If we consider only monotonically increasing differentiable
strategies, and we denote by I the class of such functions,
the problem of the strategic bidder is therefore to solve
maxβ∈I U(β) with U defined in Equation (1). This equa-
tion is crucial, as it indicates that optimizing over bidding
strategy can be reduced to finding a distribution with a well-
specified virtual value h(·). A crucial difference between
the long term vision and the classical, myopic (or one-shot)
auction theory is that bidders also maximize expected util-
ity. They might therefore be willing to sometime over-bid
(incurring a negative utility at some specific auctions) if this
reduces their reserve price. Indeed, having a lower reserve
price increases the revenue of many other auctions. Lose
small to win big. This reasoning is possible as there exist
multiple interactions between bidders and seller, billions
every day in the case of online advertising.
2.3. Discontinuity of the objective
In the previous section, we assumed the reserve value was
defined as h−1βi (0), which is well defined only if hβi is in-
creasing. This condition is complicated to ensure as, for
instance, restricting the strategies to be increasing does not
provide any guarantee on hβi . If the later is not increasing,
then the function r(1− FBi(r)) that the seller maximizes
might have several local optima, as illustrated with a specific
bid distribution in Figure 1. We mention here that this dis-
tribution actually arises during our numerical optimization
using first order splines as described in the next section.
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Figure 1. Revenue of the seller as a function of the reserve
value. This shape of revenue by running the first order spline
method described in Section 2.4 . For this distribution, there exists
two local optima that are equivalent in terms of revenue for the
seller but dramatically change the utility of the strategic bidder.
The fact that r(1− FBi(r)) is not always strictly concave
implies that the set of maximizer is not continuous but only
upper hemi-continuous; stated otherwise, the reserve value
xβi can “jump” from a small to high value with an arbitrar-
ily small change in the bidding strategy. In the example
of Figure 1, the reserve value switches from 0.18 to 0.58.
As a consequence, the expected utility of the bidder, which
is another function depending on xβi , might also jumps
erratically. In the same example, the lower bound of integra-
tion increases from 0.18 to 0.58, so that the overall integral
decreases from 0.14 to 0.09. This discontinuity makes the
optimization of the real objective difficult.
2.4. An attempt with first-order splines
A natural question is whether the buyer can compute shading
strategies numerically. A first approach is to look back
at the gradient of the bidder’s utility in the direction of a
certain function ρ, i.e., the directional derivative, that can
be computed by elementary calculus. and to look at shading
function expressed in a specific basis as
β(x) =
N∑
i=1
ci(β)fi(x) ,
and try to optimize over ci. It would be also quite natural to
do an isotonic regression and optimize over non-decreasing
functions directly; this approach is tackled later on.
A natural basis Splines (see e.g. (Hastie et al., 2001)
for a practical introduction) are a natural candidate for the
function fi’s. In particular, first order splines are piecewise
continuous functions, hence evaluating derivatives is trivial
and it is easy to account in the formula above for the finitely
many discontinuities of the derivative that will arise. If ξk’s
are given knots, first order splines are the functions
f1 = 1, f2(x) = x, fk+2(x) = (x−ξk)+ = max(x−ξk, 0) .
Higher order splines could of course also be used.
Lemma 3. As described above, the optimal shading prob-
lem can be numerically approximated using steepest de-
scent by a succession of linear programs, provided the non-
decreasing constraint on β can be written linearly in ci.
This is of course the case for 1st order spline.
Proof. After the function is expanded in a basis, the func-
tional gradient becomes a standard gradient, and the shading
function can be improved with a steepest descent. If the re-
serve value is not one of the knots, the gradient above is easy
to compute: each step of the optimization requires to solve
a constrained LP to ensure that the solution is increasing.
For 1st order splines, the derivative is constant between
knots, thus checking that β′(·) ≥ 0 amounts to check finitely
many linear constraints and so is amenable to an LP.
The objective is not even continuous, though differentiable
in a large part of the parameter space. The optimization
problem is hard. In our experiments, we got significant
improvement over bidding truthfully by using the above
numerical method. However, we encountered the disconti-
nuities of the optimization problem described above: our
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numerical optimizer got stuck at shading functions around
which the reserve value was very unstable, which corre-
sponds to revenue curves for the seller with several distant
(approximate) local maxima: a small perturbation in func-
tion space does not induce much loss of the revenue on the
seller side, but can have a huge impact on the reserve value
and hence the buyer revenue. Note that in our numerical ex-
periments we did not enforce the non-decreasing-constraint
on β but ended up with solutions that were non-decreasing.
More details on this approach are provided in Appendix D.
This is precisely the reason why, in the next section, we
introduce a relaxation of the problem that is easier to op-
timize and with the same solutions as our initial objective.
We also change the class of shading functions we consider
and use neural networks to fit them. Before we describe
these experiments, we provide some theory for the problem
of optimizing buyer revenue in lazy second price auctions.
3. Theory and a relaxation of the problem
enabling the use of gradient descent
3.1. The family of optimal extensions of a strategy
In the context of lazy second price auctions, any increasing
and continuous bidding strategy β whose reserve value r
is not 0 can be improved with β∗(x) = β(r)(1−F (r))1−F (x) on
[0, r] where β(r) = r, i.e. by thresholding the virtual value
below the current reserve value and keeping β∗ = β on
(r,+∞). Indeed, Lemma 2 yields that hβ∗(x) = 0 on
[0, r] and hβ∗ = hβ elsewhere. So the seller is indifferent
between setting the reserve price anywhere in [0, r] and we
might assume she picks 0 (if she is welfare benevolent, or
it is always possible to give an ε-incentive to pick 0, for
ε arbitrarily small). According to Myerson’s Lemma, the
strategy β∗ generates the same payment as β, so the revenue
of the seller coming from this bidder is unchanged. On
the other hand, that bidder wins more auctions with this
new strategy, hence it improves her revenue and thus her
expected utility.
In this subsection, we address the question of whether the
strategy β∗, which is simple and robust can be improved for
the bidder. Our previous argument already shows that any
improvement would be a strategy with 0 reserve value.
Differentiating Equation (2) yields
f(x)hβ(x) = (β(x)(F (x)− 1))′ .
Let us denote by r the current reserve price; we rewrite the
family of bidding strategies β with reserve value at 0 as
elements of the following constraint set:
E
(
ψB(β(X))G(β(X))1[r0≤X≤r]
) ≤ 0 ,∀0 ≤ r0 ≤ r ,
E
(
ψB(β(X))G(β(X))1[0≤X≤r]
)
= 0 .
For all those strategies, the seller revenue is maximal for the
reserve value ropt = 0, and hence under the assumption of
welfare benevolence, the seller will accept all bids of the
bidder. It is also clear that this set of constraints define all
possible strategies with reserve value 0.
The strategy β (which is increasing and continuous, say)
that maximizes the revenue of the bidder corresponds to
max
β
E
(
(X − ψB(β(X)))G(β(X))1[X≥0]
)
under the constraints that
gr0(β) = E
(
ψB(β(X))G(β(X))1[r0≤X≤r]
) ≤ 0
g0(β) = E
(
ψB(β(X))G(β(X))1[0≤X≤r]
)
= 0 .
Let us limit ourselves to not changing our strategy beyond
r, e.g. by bidding truthfully beyond r. Then we effectively
need to maximize
max
β
F (β) = E
(
(X − hβ(X))G(β(X))1[0≤X≤r]
)
.
with the continuity constraints that β(r) = r. The con-
straints can be rewritten into
gr0(β) = −E
(
ψB(β(X))G(β(X))1[0≤X≤r0]
)
= −E (hβ(X)G(β(X))1[0≤X≤r0]) .
along with gr(β) = 0. We call those strategies continua-
tion strategies as they extend the bidding below the current
reserve price/value.
Remark : in this class of feasible strategies, the optimal
reserve value for the seller is zero. So the discontinuities
of the objective function in the broader class of strategies
considered before, which stemmed from discontinuities of
the reserve value as a function of the shading function, are
not anymore problematic.
The following theorem states one of our main results.
Theorem 1. Let F , 1/(1 − F ) and G be differentiable
on [0, r]. Suppose that the virtual value ψF is such that
ψF (x) ≤ 0 on [0, r]. We consider increasing shading func-
tions β on [0, r] with β(r) = r.
Thresholding, i.e. using β∗(x) = r(1− F (r))/(1− F (x))
for 0 ≤ x ≤ r is locally optimal among continuation
strategies for which β is differentiable on [0, r], provided
G(β∗(x)) > 0 on [0, r]. It is also locally optimal among
β’s such that gr(β) is differentiable as function of r.
Furthermore, if r < 1 and G(x) = min(x, 1), i.e. the com-
petition’s distribution is Uniform[0, 1], then thresholding is
globally optimal among functions that are bounded by 1 and
differentiable.
Sketch of proof : the proof consists in keeping track of
the slack function h(r) = gr(β), rewriting locally feasible
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β’s as functions of h through differential equation manip-
ulations and finally comparing their revenue and showing
that the optimal h is zero for our objective. This requires
somewhat lengthy and delicate manipulations. In the case
of G(x) = min(x, 1), we are able to write all feasible β’s
as a function of h and carry out the program globally.
We note that we did not require in our analysis that our opti-
mization be limited to non-decreasing functions; it turns out
that our local optima are optimal in larger class of functions.
3.2. One relaxation of the objective
Instead of computing the exact reserve value in the defini-
tion of the expected utility of the bidder, we introduce a
relaxation Ur of the objective corresponding to :
Ur(βi) = E
(
(Xi − hβi(Xi))Gi(β(Xi))1[hβi (Xi)≥0]
)
.
(3)
We replaced 1[Xi≥xβi ] by 1[hβi (Xi)≥0]. This relaxation
avoids to compute the reserve value at each step of the
gradient descent and remove most of the discontinuities of
the previous objective. We now prove that the function max-
imizing Equation. 3 has non-negative virtual value. The
value of the relaxation objective at its optimum is equal to
the one in the strategic bidder problem.
Theorem 2. If an increasing and differentiable function βi
is maximizing
Ur(βi) = E
(
(Xi − hβi(Xi))Gi(βi(Xi)))1[hβi (Xi)≥0]
)
,
it has non-negative virtual value, a reserve value equal to
zero and Ur(βi) = U(βi) with
U(βi) = E
(
(Xi − hβi(Xi))Gi(βi(Xi)))1[Xi≥xβi ]
)
.
Proof. We use the fact that if hβ(x) < 0 on a certain in-
terval [a,b], we can find a new strategy β+ with higher
Ur. Let us consider the rightmost interval [a,b] where
hβ(x) < 0. On [b,+∞], β+ = β. Then on [a,b], β+(x) =
β(b)(1 − F (b)/(1 − F (x)). β+ verifies hβ+(x) = 0 on
[a, b]. Then if we denote T = β+(a), we define β+ on [0,a]
as β+(x) = β(x) + (T − β(a))(1 − F (a))/(1 − F (x)).
We have hβ+ = hβ on [0,a]. β+ is continuous. With
f(x)hβ(x) = (β(x)(F (x)− 1))′, we see that β(1− F ) is
non-decreasing on [a,b]. Hence β+(a) ≥ β(a). Therefore,
∀x, β+(x) ≥ β(x) and G(β+(x)) ≥ G(β(x)). Hence,
Ur(β
∗) ≥ Ur(β). Then, we tackle the next interval where
hβ(x) < 0 by doing the same manipulation on β+. We
conclude by induction on the intervals where hβ ≤ 0.
Thus, a solution of the relaxation has a virtual value positive
everywhere and a reserve value equal to zero. In this case,
Ur(βi) = U(βi).
This new objective enables to run simple gradient descent
algorithms without the need to recompute the reserve value
at each iteration. It is also more stable than the original one
since a local change of the virtual value does not completely
change the value of the objective, which could be the case
when the reserve value were part of the objective.
4. Experimental setup
We present in this section the complete approach and report
the uplift of the new bidding strategies in various revenue-
maximizing auctions.
4.1. Our architecture
To fit the optimal strategies, we use a simple one-layer
neural network with 200 ReLus. We replace the indicator
function by a sigmoid function to have a fully differentiable
objective and we optimize
Uη(βi) = EXi∼Fi
(
(Xi−hβi(Xi))Gi(β(Xi))σ(ηhβi(Xi))
)
.
with σ(x) = 11+exp(−x) and η = 1000. We start with a
batch size of 10000 examples, sampled according to the
value distribution of the bidder. We use a stochastic gradient
algorithm (SGD) with a decreasing learning rate starting
at 0.001. The full code in PyTorch is provided with the
paper. The learning of an affine shading strategy is also
provided in the notebook and is reaching already very decent
performance.
In our setting, we assume that Gi is known. However, we
could replace its expression by an approximation Gˆi learned
from past examples of bids of the competition or on the
winning distribution of bidder i computed on past auctions
(in practice one may have to use survival analysis techniques
to account for censoring of the observations). The results
for the lazy second price auction with personalized price are
presented in Table 1 and in Table 2.
4.2. Extension to other types of auction
Our approach can easily be extended to many other types of
auctions. Only a few lines of code are needed to adapt the
objective to other mechanisms.
The Myerson auction. The Myerson auction (Myerson,
1981) consists in using the virtual value both for the alloca-
tion and payment rules. The item is allocated to the bidder
with the highest non-negative virtual value that pays:
ψ−1Bi (max(maxj 6=i
ψBj (Xj), 0))
As for the lazy second price auction, we can use the Myerson
lemma and show that the expected utility of the strategic
bidder using the strategy β in the Myerson auction is
Ui(βi) = E ([Xi − hβi(Xi)]FZ(hβi(Xi))) .
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with FZ the cumulative distribution function of Z =
max2≤j≤K(0, ψj(Xj)), Xi is the value of bidder i, and
hβi = ψBi(βi(Xi)) is the virtual value function associated
with the bid distribution. For some distribution, the optimal
strategy can be analytically computed. For instance, for
the uniform distribution, we can prove this lemma which
defines the optimal strategies.
Lemma 4 (Shading against (K− 1) uniform bidders). Sup-
pose that x has a positive density on its support and assume
that x is bounded by (K+1)/(K−1). Let  > 0 be chosen
by bidder 1 arbitrarily close to 0. Let us call
h
()
K (x) =
{
K−1
K

1+x if x ∈ [0, (1 + )/(K − 1)) ,
K−1
K
(
x− 1K−1
)
if x ≥ (1 + )/(K − 1) .
A near-optimal shading strategy is for bidder 1 to shade her
value through
β
()
1 (x) = E
(
h
()
K (t)|t ≥ x
)
.
As  goes to 0+, this strategy approaches the optimum.
If the support of x is within (1/(K− 1), (K+ 1)/(K− 1)),
then  can be taken equal to 0.
The full proof is in Appendix C. Since in this specific set-
ting optimal strategies have a known closed form, our op-
timization pipeline can be tested to see if it recovers these
strategies. With the same pipeline used in Section 4.1, we
optimize
Ui(βi) = E ([Xi − hβi(Xi)]FZ(hβi(Xi))) .
Appendix E.2 focuses on the uniform distribution where our
algorithm recover exactly the strategies proposed in Lemma
9 showing the robustness of our approach.
The interest of the optimization pipeline is the direct exten-
sion to all possible value distributions without the need to
solve at each time a new system of differential equations.
The performance with an exponential value distribution is
provided in Table 1.
Eager second price auction with monopoly reserve
prices. The eager second price auction consists of running
a second price auction but only among bidders that clear
their personalized reserve price. The objective function is
very similar to the one of the lazy second price auction
except that the winning distribution is different below the
reserve price of the other bidders. Indeed, if all other bidders
are below their reserve price, the strategic bidders that bids
above his monopoly price is sure to win and only pays her
monopoly price. We provide more details in Appendix E.3.
The boosted second price auction. (BSP) Two small
variants of the boosted second price auction (BSP) (Gol-
rezaei et al., 2017) can also be addressed. We deal with the
BSP auction as it seems to be one of the state of the art alter-
native to the second price auction with personalized reserve
price to be used in practice and deals with heterogeneities
between bidders. In the original paper, the seller computes
first the reserve prices of each bidder based on their bid
distributions. Then, the algorithm computes a boosting fac-
tor γi > 0 for each bidder by counterfactually maximizing
the revenue of the seller. More precisely, the auction is ran
according to :
Algorithm 1 Boosted second price (r, γ)
- First each bidder i submits his bid bi
- Define S as a set of bidders whose bids exceed their
reserve price, i.e, S = {i : bi ≥ ri}
- If the set S is empty, the item is not allocated. Oth-
erwise, the item is allocated to bidder i∗ with the high-
est boosted bid, i.e., i∗ = argmaxi∈S{biγi} and she
pays max{ri∗ ,maxi∈S,i 6=i∗{biγi/γi∗}}. For other bid-
ders, the payment is zero.
To explain intuitively our two objectives corresponding to
this auction, we consider first the example of the family
of generalized Pareto distributions. As the virtual value of
all distributions in this family is affine, the boosted second
price auction is strictly equivalent to the Myerson auction
in this family. It explains why this auction can perform well
in practice for the seller since it avoids to compute exactly
the virtual value by approximating it by a linear fit.
In the first model, we assume that the seller first makes an
affine-fit through an L2 regression on the virtual values she
observes. Then, she runs a Myerson auction based on these
L2 fits. In the case of Generalized Pareto distributions, this
procedure results exactly in the BSP auction. If we note ψˆBi
the L2 fit of the virtual value corresponding to the bid distru-
tion and hˆβi = ψˆBi ◦βi, we optimize the Myerson objective
with hˆβi corresponding to the fit of hβi . The main difference
with the BSP auction for non-generalized pareto distribu-
tions is that the fit is used to compute the reserve price. In
the second objective, we adress this limitation by computing
first the reserve price ri based on the observed ψBi . Then,
the algorithm computes a linear fit of ψBi on bids higher
than ri. This linear fit is used as the boosting parameter for
bidder i. To make the objective differentiable, we consider
the relaxation where ri is assumed to beminr(ψBi(r) > 0).
We verify retrospectively that the final strategy verifies
minr(ψBi(r) > 0) = argmax(ri(1− FBi(ri)))
Our experiments show that our approach can also be empiri-
cally generalized to more advanced, intricate, practical and
modern settings, on top of working well theoretically on the
lazy second price auctions.
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Auction Type K=2 K=3 K=4
Baselines Utility of truthful strategy (in revenue maximizing) 0.30 0.24 0.21Utility of truthful strategy (in welfare maximizing) 0.50 0.33 0.25
Lazy second price auction Utility of strategic bidder 0.45± 0.001 0.31± 0.001 0.24± 0.001Uplift vs truthful bidding +50% +29% +14%
Eager second price auction Utility of strategic bidder 0.52± 0.02 0.33± 0.02 0.25± 0.02Uplift vs truthful bidding +73% +37% +19%
Myerson auction Utility of strategic bidder 0.64± 0.001 0.45± 0.001 0.35± 0.001Uplift vs truthful bidding +113% +87% +67%
Boosted second price Utility of strategic bidder 0.48± 0.03 0.41± 0.001 0.32± 0.001Uplift vs truthful bidding +60% +71% +52%
Table 1. All bidders have an exponential value distribution with parameter λ = 1. The strategic bidder has K-1 opponents
bidding truthfully and having a reserve price equal to 1.0, their monopoly price. The reserve price of the strategic bidder is
computed on her bid distribution. For each run, the evaluation is based on 106 samples, and we average the performances over
10 learnings. The utility of the strategic bidder can be higher that in the welfare-maximizing auction because revenue maximizing
auctions remove competition below the reserve price, as illustrated by some examples in Appendix E.
4.3. Evaluation and results
Two different value distributions were used to run the ex-
periments: the exponential distribution in Table 1 and the
uniform distribution in Table 2 in Appendix. We focus on a
small number of bidders since it is where the reserve price
play an important role for the seller. (Celis et al., 2014)
also noticed that the median of the number of participants
in online advertising auctions is 6.
To compute the real performance of the strategy, we are
conservative in the computation of the reserve price since
we use ri = max(b|ψBi(b) < 0). We then compute the
performance by computing the objective (expected utility)
with Monte-Carlo simulations. For the lazy second price
with personalized reserve price, we use for instance
U(βi) = E
(
(Xi−hβi(Xi))Gi(β(Xi))1(βi(Xi) ≥ ri)
)
.
We compare the performance of our strategies with two base-
lines: the utility of one bidder bidding truthfully in a second
price auction without reserve price (the welfare maximizing
auction) and in a second price auction with monopoly price
(with symmetric bidders, this auction is equivalent to the
Myerson auction and is revenue-maximizing for the seller).
For BSP, we report results for the second objective which
is the closest one to the corresponding procedure of (Gol-
rezaei et al., 2017). The first one gives similar uplifts that
the strategic behavior in the Myerson auction. The order
of magnitude of the uplift reported is significant. We ob-
serve that BSP and the Myerson auction are less robust to
strategic behavior than the lazy second price auction with
personalized reserve price. Indeed, as in the eager version
of the second price auction there is no competition when all
other bidders are below their reserve price. It is not the case
for the lazy second price auction explaining why the uplift
are slightly lower for this specific auction.
We focused on the stationary case where the strategic bid-
der has to choose one strategy implying a bid distribution
and the seller will immediately optimize their mechanism
according to this bid distribution. However, our differential
approach allows some generalizations. In future work, we
could adapt the differential approach to more dynamic set-
tings where the seller uses a particular dynamic to update
the reserve price based on past bids of the bidders.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that machine learning can be
efficiently used on the bidder side to learn how to shade
in revenue-maximizing auctions that are optimized based
on past bids (or a distribution announced by the bidder
to which she commits). Our work, both theoretical and
practical, complements the classical approach using sta-
tistical learning from the seller’s standpoint showing that
strategic bidding can be implemented in some of the main
revenue-maximizing auctions. Our work also raises ques-
tions about many automatic mechanism procedures since
many are based on the assumption of having observed past
truthful bids in order to optimize mechanisms. From an
industry point of view, our work provides a new argument
to come back to simple and more transparent auction mech-
anisms that are less subject to optimization on both the
bidders’ and the seller’s sides.
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A. Results for the uniform distribution
Auction Type K=2 K=3 K=4
Baselines Utility of truthful strategy (in revenue maximizing) 0.083 0.057 0.040Utility of truthful strategy (in welfare maximizing) 0.166 0.083 0.050
Lazy second price auction Utility of strategic bidder 0.141± 0.001 0.077± 0.001 0.048± 0.001Uplift vs truthful bidding +72% +36% +20%
Eager second price auction Utility of strategic bidder 0.126± 0.01 0.083± 0.01 0.050± 0.002Uplift vs revenue-maximizing +51% +46% +25%
Myerson auction Utility of strategic bidder 0.246± 0.001 0.131± 0.01 0.079± 0.001Uplift vs revenue-maximizing +195% +130% +97.5%
Boosted second price Utility of strategic bidder 0.24± 0.01 0.08± 0.01 0.055± 0.002Uplift vs revenue maximizing +200% +40% +37.5%
Table 2. All bidders have a uniform value distribution. The strategic bidder has K − 1 opponents, all bidding truthfully. The
reserve price of all other bidders is equal to 0.5. The reserve price of the strategic bidder is computed on her bid distribution.
For each run, the evaluation is based on 106 samples. We average on 10 learnings the performance of the strategies. The utility
of the strategic bidder can be higher that in the welfare-maximizing auction because revenue maximizing auctions are removing the
competition below the reserve price. We provide some examples of strategies in Appendix E.
B. Proofs for Section 3
Recall that our setup is that we are given a strategy β and a current reserve value r. We want to extend our strategy below r
in a way that is optimal, at least locally optimal. We assume throughout that the seller is welfare benevolent.
So we have to solve the infinite programming problem
max
β
F (β) = E
(
[X − hβ(X)]G(β(X))1[0≤X≤r]
)
subject to ∀t , 0 ≤ t ≤ r E (hβ(X)G(β(X))1[t≤X≤r]) ≤ 0
and E
(
hβ(X)Gβ(X)1[0≤X≤r]
)
= 0 , β(r) = β(r+)
where β(r+) is given by the strategy that had reserve value at r. This is just a continuity requirement and it ensures that
Myerson’s formula applies.
Of course the seller revenue for bids below r if she sets the reserve value at t is
E
(
hβ(X)G(β(X))1[t≤X≤r]
)
Note that the constraints mean that the max revenue of the seller is achieved for the reserve value 0 and it is 0. We know that
the reserve value should be 0, because otherwise the buyer could use thresholding below the reserve value to increase her
revenue and not change the revenue the seller derives from her in a lazy second price auction. So that guarantees that the
reserve value is 0.
B.1. The case G(x) = min(x, 1)
Let r be given. Call −h(x) the revenue of the seller on [x, r]. The constraints on h is that h(r) = 0, h(0) = 0 and h ≥ 0 on
[0, r]. That way the revenue of the seller is maximized at x∗ = 0.
We assume that β ≤ β(r) = r < 1. So then G(β) = β.
B.1.1. PRELIMINARIES
Using results in the main text, i.e. hβ(x)f(x) = [β(x)(F (x)− 1)]′, our constraints can be written in differential form as∫ r
x
[β(F − 1)]′G(β) =
∫ r
x
[β(F − 1)]′β =
∫ r
x
[β(F − 1)]′ β(F − 1)
F − 1 = −h .
So if u = [β(1− F )]2, we have equivalently ∫ r
x
u′
1
1− F = 2h(x) .
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If we integrate by parts, using the fact that (1/(1− F ))′ = f/(1− F )2 and call m(x) = u(x)/(1− F (x) = β2(1− F ),
we get
m(r)−m(x)−
∫ r
x
m(u)
f(u)
1− F (u) = 2h(x) . (4)
Assuming temporarily h is differentiable, we differentiate Equation (4) to get
−m′(x) +m(x)g(x) = 2h′(x) , with g(x) = f(x)
1− F (x) = −(log(1− F ))
′ .
Because this is a first order ODE, we can integrate this equation fully to get
m(x) =
1
1− F (x)
[
β2(r)(1− F (r))2 + 2
∫ r
x
h′(t)(1− F (t))dt
]
.
Note that this is the family of solutions among m that are differentiable.
B.1.2. KEY RESULT
So we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose G(x) = min(x, 1) and call −h the revenue of the seller at x. The unique shading function β such
that β2(1− F ) is differentiable and β(x) ≤ 1 is β > 0 such
β2(x;h) = β2(x) =
1
(1− F (x))2
[
β2(r)(1− F (r))2 + 2
(∫ r
x
h(t)f(t)dt− h(x)(1− F (x))
)]
.
Recall that our constraint is that β(r) = r < 1. Of course h = 0 corresponds to the thresholded function.
Proof. Put all of the above together and then integrate by parts
∫ r
x
h′(t)(1− F (t))dt to get the formulation above.
B.1.3. BACK TO THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
We can naturally view h as a slack variable. By contrast to classical finite dimensional optimization, our slack variable is a
function. We wish to maximize
Π(h) =
∫ r
0
xG(β(x;h))f(x)dx =
∫ r
0
xβ(x;h)f(x)dx ,
as we assume that β(x;h) remains below 1. Note that the part of the integral involving hβ has now disappeared as we
consider functions for which the average payment over [0, r] is zero - that is the sense of our equality constraint.
Consider Π(h), with  very small. Since
√
1 + t = 1 + t2 , we see that
β(x; h) = β(x; 0) +

β(r)(1− F (r))
1
1− F (x)
[∫ r
x
h(t)f(t)dt− h(x)(1− F (x))
]
,
where we have used that h(r) = 0. So we have
Π(h) = Π(0) +

β(r)(1− F (r))
∫ r
0
xf(x)
1− F (x)
[∫ r
x
h(t)f(t)dt− h(x)(1− F (x))
]
dx .
The question becomes whether∫ r
0
xf(x)
1− F (x)
[∫ r
x
h(t)f(t)dt− h(x)(1− F (x))
]
dx ≤ 0 .
Lemma 5. Suppose that ψF (x) = x− 1−F (x)f(x) ≤ 0 on [0, r]. Then, if h ≥ 0,∫ r
0
xf(x)
1− F (x)
[∫ r
x
h(t)f(t)dt− h(x)(1− F (x))
]
dx ≤ 0
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Proof. We have, using Fubini’s theorem,∫ r
0
xf(x)
1− F (x)
[∫ r
x
h(t)f(t)dt− h(x)(1− F (x))
]
dx = −
∫ r
0
xh(x)f(x) +
∫ r
0
∫ r
0
xf(x)
1− F (x)h(t)f(t)1[t>x]dxdt ,
= −
∫ r
0
xh(x)f(x) +
∫ r
0
h(t)f(t)
∫ x
0
yf(y)
1− F (y)dydt ,
= −
∫ r
0
h(x)f(x)
[
x−
∫ x
0
yf(y)
1− F (y)dy
]
.
Now since ψF (x) = x− 1−F (x)f(x) ≤ 0, we have equivalently
xf(x)
1− F (x) ≤ 1 .
Hence, ∫ x
0
yf(y)
1− F (y)dy ≤
∫ x
0
1dy = x .
We conclude that for all h ≥ 0,∫ r
0
xf(x)
1− F (x)
[∫ r
x
h(t)f(t)dt− h(x)(1− F (x))
]
dx ≤ 0 .
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For the problem of revenue optimization of the buyer, thresholding is a locally optimal (among functions such
that β2(1− F ) is differentiable and β is bounded by 1 on [0, r] when the competition has cdf G(x) = min(x, 1) for x ≥ 0.
Furthermore, it is globally optimal among those bidding strategies.
Proof. The local optimally comes from the previous analysis.
The global optimality comes from the fact that using the concavity of
√
1 + x, we have
√
1 + x ≤ 1 + x2 for all x ≥ −1.
Then the upper bound is what we computed above. So an upper bound on the revenue is lower than the thresholded revenue
and we have global optimality.
B.2. The general case, local optimality
We now prove local optimality for general differentiable G using differential ideas similar to the ones above. Let  > 0 and
β = β
∗(1 + ρ). β∗ = C/(1− F (x)) is the shading function corresponding to thresholding the virtual value. Recall that
C = r(1− F (r)) for continuity at r. Below, ρ is a differentiable function. We require ρ(r) = 0 to have continuity of β at
r. Recall the constraints that for all feasible β’s,
∀x ≤ r ,
∫ r
x
[β(F − 1)]′G(β) = −h(x) ≤ 0 , and h(0) = 0 .
h(r) = 0 by construction. We assume that β is feasible for  ∈ [0, 0), which gives us the notion of locality we need.
Because [β∗(F − 1)]′ = 0, we have∫ r
x
[β(F − 1)]′G(β) = 
∫ r
x
(ρβ∗(F − 1))′G(β∗ + ρβ∗) = −h
and hence by limiting ourselves to the first order term in the Taylor expansion (the second order term in  is asymptotically
negligible), ∫ r
x
(ρβ∗(F − 1))′G(β∗) = −h(x) ≤ 0 ,∀x ≤ r .
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Assuming that h is differentiable, we can differentiate the previous equality to get
(ρ(x)β∗(x)(F − 1)(x))′G(β∗(x)) = h′(x) ,
and using the fact that ρ(r) = 0 because we want continuity at r, we get
β∗(x)ρ(x)(1− F (x)) =
∫ r
x
h′(x)
G(β∗(x))
dx =
∫ r
x
h(x)[β∗]′(x)g(β∗(x))
G2(β∗(x))
dx− h(x)
G(β∗(x))
.
The last equality comes from integration by parts.
B.2.1. BACK TO THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Recall that we see to maximize over admissible ρ’s (i.e. those for which the inequality constraints are verified),
max
ρ
∫ x
0
xf(x)G(β∗(x)(1 + ρ(x)))dx ' max
ρ
∫ x
0
xf(x)G(β∗(x)) + 
∫ r
0
xf(x)g(β∗(x))ρ(x)β∗(x)dx .
Where the equality is to first order in the Taylor expansion. We claim that if ρ is admissible, then the second term is negative.
Lemma 6. Let β∗(x) = C/(1− F (x). Assume that G(β∗(x)) > 0 on [0,r]. Suppose that ψF (x) ≤ 0 on [0, r). Suppose
the function ρ is such that for h ≥ 0, h(r) = 0
β∗(x)ρ(x)(1− F (x)) =
∫ r
x
h(x)[β∗]′(x)g(β∗(x))
G2(β∗(x))
dx− h(x)
G(β∗(x))
.
Then
I =
∫ r
0
xf(x)g(β∗(x))ρ(x)β∗(x)dx ≤ 0 .
Proof. The strategy is the same as above. Let us call β∗ = β to make the notation less cumbersome. Replacing ρ by its
value, we have, using the fact that β(x) = C/(1− F (x)),
I/C = −
∫
xf(x)
1− F (x)g(β(x))
h(x)
G(β(x))
dx+
∫ r
0
dx
xf(x)
1− F (x)g(β(x))
∫ r
x
h(t)β′(t)g(β(t))
G2(β(t))
dt
= −
∫
xf(x)
1− F (x)g(β(x))
h(x)
G(β(x))
dx+
∫ r
0
∫ r
0
xf(x)
1− F (x)g(β(x))
h(t)β′(t)g(β(t))
G2(β(t))
1[t≥x]dxdt
= −
∫
xf(x)
1− F (x)g(β(x))
h(x)
G(β(x))
dx+
∫ r
0
dx
h(x)β′(x)g(β(x))
G2(β(x))
∫ x
0
yf(y)
1− F (y)g(β(y))dy
Now recall that β′(t) = Cf/(1− F )2, C > 0, so that∫ x
0
yf(y)
1− F (y)g(β(y))dy =
1
C
∫ x
0
y(1− F (y))β′(y)g(β(y))dy ,
=
1
C
[
t(1− F (t))G(β(t))|x0 −
∫ x
0
G(β(t))[t(1− F (t))]′
]
.
Of course, (t(1− F (t)))′ = −f(x)ψF (x) ≥ 0 since ψF (x) ≤ 0. So we have∫ x
0
yf(y)
1− F (y)g(β(y))dy ≤
1
C
x(1− F (x))G(β(x)) .
Hence, since β′(x) > 0 and h(x) > 0∫ r
0
dx
h(x)β′(x)g(β(x))
G2(β(x))
∫ x
0
yf(y)
1− F (y)g(β(y))dy ≤
∫ r
0
dx
h(x)β′(x)g(β(x))
G2(β(x))
1
C
x(1− F (x))G(β(x))
=
∫ r
0
dx
h(x) Cf(x)[1−F (x)]2 g(β(x))
G(β(x))
1
C
x(1− F (x))
=
∫ r
0
dx
xh(x) f(x)[1−F (x)]g(β(x))
G(β(x))
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We conclude that
I ≤ 0 .
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Suppose that F , 1−F and G are differentiable. Suppose furthermore that ψF (x) = x− (1−F (x))/f(x) ≤ 0
on [0, r]. Then the function β∗ = r(1 − F (r))/(1 − F (x)) is locally optimal among differentiable shading strategies,
provided G(β∗(x)) > 0 on [0,r].
Proof. Two cases are possible. Either β∗ is an isolated point in which case it is by definition locally optimal. If that is not
the case, the previous computations show that β∗ is locally optimal as any local deviation in the feasible set of shading
functions yields lower utility for the buyer - that is the content of Lemma 6.
C. Proof of the results on Myerson auction with one strategic bidder
The Myerson auction (Myerson, 1981) consists in using the virtual value to both define the allocation rule and the payment
rule. The item is allocated to the bidder with the highest non-negative virtual value and she pays:
ψ−1Bi (max(maxj 6=i
ψBj (Xj), 0))
As for the lazy second price auction, we can use the Myerson lemma and show that the expected utility of the strategic
bidder using the bidding strategy β in the Myerson auction is
Ui(βi) = E ([Xi − hβi(Xi)]FZ(hβi(Xi))) .
with FZ the cumulative distribution function of Z = max2≤j≤K(0, ψj(Xj)), Xi is the value of bidder i, and hβi =
ψBi(βi(Xi)) is the virtual value function associated with the bid distribution. Suppose that β 7→ βt = β + tρ, where t > 0
is small and ρ is a function. We note that hβ+tρ(x) = hβ + thρ. We have the following result.
Lemma 7. Suppose we change β into βt = β + tρ. Both β and βt are assumed to be non-decreasing. Call xβ the reserve
value corresponding to β, assume it has the property that hβ(xβ) = 0 and h′β(xβ) 6= 0 (h′β is assumed to exist locally).
Assume xβ is the unique global maximizer of the revenue of the seller. Then,
∂
∂t
U(βt)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= E
(
hρ(X)[(X − hβ(X))fZ(hβ(X))− FZ(hβ(X))]1[X>xβ ]
)
+
hρ(xβ)
h′β(xβ)
K∏
i=2
FVi(0)f1(xβ)xβ ,
Proof. Proof. Taking directional derivative of the utility of the bidder gives the equation.
In the work below, we naturally seek a shading function β such that these directional derivatives are equal to 0. We
will therefore be interested in particular in functions β such that [x− ψB(β(x))]fZ(ψB(β(x))) = FZ(ψB(β(x))), when
ψB(β(x)) > 0. The second term in our equation has intuitively to do with the event where the other bidders are discarded for
not beating their reserve price. As we will see below, we can sometimes ignore this term, for instance when an equilibrium
strategy exists which amounts to canceling the reserve value (xβ = 0 in this case).
We will be keenly interested in shading functions β such that
(x− ψB(β(x)))fZ(ψB(β(x))) = FZ(ψB(β(x))) , when ψB(β(x)) > 0 .
Indeed, for those β’s, the expectation in our differential will be 0. Hence, computing the differential will be relatively simple
and in particular will give us reasonable guesses for β and descent directions, even if it does not always give us directly an
optimal shading strategy. Furthermore, when K is large, the second term fades out, as the probability that no other bidder
clear their reserve prices becomes very small.
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If we proceed formally, and call, for x > 0, h(x) = (id + FZ/fZ)−1(x) (temporarily assuming that this - possibly
generalized - functional inverse can be made sense of), we see that solving the previous equation amounts to solving
ψB(β(x)) = (id + FZ/fZ)−1(x) = h(x) .
Lemma 2 can of course be brought to bear on this problem. We note that we will be primarily interested in solutions of this
equation for x’s such that ψB(β(x)) > 0.
C.1. Explicit computations in the case of Generalized Pareto families
It is clear that now we need to understand FZ , FZ/fZ and related quantities to make progress. By definition, if X is
Generalized Pareto (GP) with parameters (µ, σ, ξ), we have, when ξ < 0 and t ∈ [µ, µ− σ/ξ],
P (X ≥ t) = (1 + ξ(t− µ)/σ)−1/ξ
and otherwise P (X ≥ t) = E (()− (t− µ)/σ) if ξ = 0. In GP families, the virtual value has the form ψ(t) = cψ(t− r∗),
where r∗ is the monopoly price and cψ = 1− ξ.
Lemma 8. Suppose Y has a Generalized Pareto distribution. Call FY the cdf of Y and fY its density.
If V = ψY (Y ), where ψY is the virtual value of Y , we have FV (t) = FY (ψ−1Y (t)) and
FV (t)
fV (t)
= cψ
FY (ψ
−1
Y (t))
fY (ψ
−1
Y (t))
,
where cψY = ψ
′
Y (t). If r
∗
Y is the monopoly price associated with Y , we more specifically have
ψ−1Y (t) =
t
cψY
+ r∗Y , and
FV (t)
fV (t)
= cψY
FY (t/cψY + r
∗
Y )
fY (t/cψY + r
∗
Y )
.
In case FY has finite support, we naturally restrict t to values such that x = ψ−1Y (t) is just that fY (x) > 0.
Proof. FV is just the cumulative distribution function of ψY (Y ), where ψY is the virtual value of Y . Hence, since in GP
families ψY is increasing,
FV (t) = P (V ≤ t) = P (ψY (Y ) ≤ t) = FY (ψ−1Y (t)) .
In particular,
fV (t) =
fY (ψ
−1
Y (t))
ψ′Y (ψ
−1
Y (t))
.
In Generalized Pareto families, ψY is linear, so that ψ′Y is a constant, because ψY (t) = cψY (t − r∗Y ), where r∗Y is the
monopoly price. The first result follows immediately. Noticing that ψ−1Y (x) = x/cψY + r
∗
Y gives the second result.
The previous lemma yields the following useful corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose K ≥ 2, Y2, . . . , YK are independent, identically distributed, with Generalized Pareto distribution.
Call ψY their virtual value function and Z = max2≤i≤K(0, ψY (Yi)). Then, if FZ is the cumulative distribution function of
Z, we have
FZ(t)
fZ(t)
=
cψY
K − 1
FY (t/cψY + r
∗
Y )
fY (t/cψY + r
∗
Y )
, for t > 0 and such that fY (t/cψY + r
∗
Y ) > 0 .
C.2. An example: uniform non-strategic bidders
In this subsection we assume that bidder 1 is facing K − 1 other bidders, with values Yi’s that are i.i.d U [0, 1]. In this case,
cψY = 2 and r
∗
Y = 1/2 so FZ(t) = min(1, [(t+ 1)/2]
K−1) for t > 0. We recall that the U [0, 1] distribution is GP(0,1,-1).
Bidder 1 is strategic whereas bidders 2 to K are not and bid truthfully.
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Lemma 9 (Shading against (K − 1) uniform bidders). Suppose that x has a density that is positive on its support. We
assume for simplicity that x is bounded by (K + 1)/(K − 1). Let  > 0 be chosen by bidder 1 arbitrarily close to 0. Let us
call
h
()
K (x) =
{
K−1
K

1+x if x ∈ [0, (1 + )/(K − 1)) ,
K−1
K
(
x− 1K−1
)
if x ≥ (1 + )/(K − 1) .
A near-optimal shading strategy is for bidder 1 to shade her value through
β
()
1 (x) = E
(
h
()
K (t)|t ≥ x
)
.
As  goes to 0+, this strategy approaches the optimum.
If the support of x is within (1/(K − 1), (K + 1)/(K − 1)), then  can be taken equal to 0.
Proof. If we call h(x) = ψB(β(x)) we can in this case write bidder 1’s expected payoff directly using the results of the
previous subsection:
U(β) =
∫
x:h(x)>0
(x− h(x)) min
(
1,
[h(x) + 1]K−1
2K−1
)
f1(x)dx .
In light of the fact we want to maximize this integral as a function of h, with the requirement that h > 0, it is natural to
study the function fx(c) = (x− c)[c+ 1]K−1.
If we call hK(x) = argmaxc≥0 fx(c), we can split the problem into two cases. If x > 1/(K − 1), hK(x) =
K−1
K
(
x− 1K−1
)
. Note that with our assumption that x ≤ (K + 1)/(K − 1), hK(x) ≤ 1. For x < 1/(K − 1),
the function fx(·) is decreasing for c ≥ 0. Hence,
hK(x) = argmaxc≥0(x− c)[c+ 1]K−1 =
{
0 if x ≤ 1/(K − 1) ,
K−1
K
(
x− 1K−1
)
if x > 1/(K − 1) .
Recall that for Lemma 2 to apply, we need to integrate an increasing function and hK is not increasing on (0,∞).
However, bidder 1 can use the following -approximation strategy: let us call
h
()
K (x) =
{
K−1
K

1+x if x ∈ [0, (1 + )/(K − 1)) ,
K−1
K
(
x− 1K−1
)
if x ≥ (1 + )/(K − 1) .
Notice that supx |h()K (x)− hK(x)| < /K. In light of Lemmas 2 and 7, the corresponding function
β
()
1 (x) = E
(
h
()
K (x)|x ≥ x
)
is increasing and will then guarantee an expected payoff that is nearly optimal since it will be
U(β()) =
1
2K−1
∫
(x− h()K (x))[h)K(x) + 1]K−1f1(x)dx .
It can be made arbitrarily close to optimal by decreasing . Using  > 0 guarantees that the virtualized bid h()K (x) is always
strictly positive and hence effectively sends the monopoly price for bidder 1 to 0. (Even if β(0) is increasing, a potential
problem might occur if the virtualized bid is exactly zero. Using β() with  = 0+ solves that problem. We can also verify a
posteriori that it also avoids potential problems related to ironing, which justifies post-hoc the formulation of the utility we
used in the first place.)
If x is supported on a subset of [1/(K − 1), (K + 1)/(K − 1)), taking  = 0 is possible and optimal.
The assumption that x ≤ (K + 1)/(K − 1) can easily be dispensed of as the proof makes clear : one simply needs to look
for the argmax of another function. Our main example follows and does not require taking care of this minor technical
problem.
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Figure 2. Myerson auction: Bids and virtualized bids with one strategic bidder There are K=4 bidders, only one of them is strategic.
On the left hand side, we present a plot of the bids sent to the seller. “Linear shading” corresponding to a bid βα(x) = αx, where x
is the value of bidder 1; here α is chosen numerically to maximize that buyer’s payoff - see Lemma 7. “Optimal” corresponds to the
strategy described in Lemma 9, with  = 0+. On the right hand side (RHS), we present the virtualized bids, i.e. the value taken by the
associated virtual value functions evaluated at the bids sent to the seller. This corresponds on average to what the buyer is paying in the
Myerson auction, when those virtualized bids clear 0. We can interpret the RHS figure as showing that for both optimal and linear shading,
a strategic buyer end up winning more often and paying less (conditional on the fact that she won) than if she had been truthful; this
explains why her average payoff is higher than with truthful bidding.
Case where bidder 1 has value distribution U [0, 1] We first note that x ≤ 1 ≤ (K + 1)/(K − 1), so Lemma 9 applies
as-is. We therefore have
β
()
1 (x) =
{
K−1
K [
1
2 (1 + x)− 1K−1 ] if 1 ≥ x ≥ x = 1+K−1 ,
K−1
K
1
1−x
(

1+
1
2 (x
2
 − x2) + β()1 (x)(1− x)
)
if x < 1+K−1 .
Taking  to 0 yields
β1(x) =
{
K−1
K [
1
2 (1 + x)− 1K−1 ] if x ≥ 1K−1 ,
1
1−x
(K−2)2
2(K−1)K if x <
1
K−1 .
See Figure 2 for a plot of β1 and comparison to other possible shading strategies.
Similar computations can be carried out if x has another GP distribution. For those distributions, the shading beyond
1/(K − 1) is also affine in the value of bidder 1, x. Interestingly, it is easy to verify that affine transformations of GP
random variables are GP. However, if the support of x includes part of (0, 1/(K − 1)), β1(x) will not have a GP distribution
in general.
C.3. Further computations in the Generalized Pareto case
Lemma 10. Suppose a strategic bidder faces K − 1 opponents sharing the same distribution FY in the Generalized Pareto
family. Then, assuming that the seller is welfare benevolent, her optimal shading function is such that her virtualized bid
hoptimal(x) satisfies
hoptimal(x) = max(0, ψY (β
I
Y,K(ψ
−1
Y (x)))) .
where βIY,K is the first price bid of a bidder facing competition with cdf G = F
K−1
Y . The corresponding shading function β
can be easily obtained by an application of Lemmas 2 and 7.
Comment : we can of course find hoptimal as above to approximate hoptimal by an increasing positive function that is
arbitrarily close to our target and avoid various technical issues.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 10 The computation for independent uniform opponents generalizes easily to opponents with value
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distributions in other GP families. In particular we need to find h that maximizes∫
x:h(x)≥0
(x− h(x))
[
FY
(
h(x)
cψY
+ r∗Y
)]K−1
f1(x)dx .
We can maximize point by point and hence we are looking for t∗(x) such that
t∗(x) = argmaxt(x− t)FY
(
t
cψY
+ r∗Y
)K−1
, t > 0 .
Differentiating the above expression gives
δ(t) = fY (t/cψY + r)F
K−2
Y (t/cψY + r
∗
Y )
[
x− t
cψY
− 1
K − 1
FY
fY
(t/cψY + r
∗
Y )
]
.
The expression in the bracket can be written ψ−1Y (x) −H(ψ−1Y (t)) where H = id + GY,K−1gY,K−1 , where GY,K−1 is the cdf
of the max of K − 1 i.i.d random variables and gY,K−1 its derivative. Elementary computations show that this function
is increasing in GP families. In fact its derivative can be shown to be 1 + (1− ξσG(x)/(1−G(x)))/(K − 1) and ξ < 0.
Hence H(ψ−1Y (t)) is also increasing. Hence δ(t) is a decreasing function of t. It is also trivially continuous in GP families.
We conclude that the equation δ(t) = 0 has at most 1 positive root.
If ψ−1Y (x) < H(ψ
−1
Y (0)), we see that δ(t) < 0 for t ≥ 0, in which case t∗ = 0. If that is not the case, then ψ−1Y (t∗) =
H−1(ψ−1Y (x)). Hence we have shown that t
∗ = max(0, ψY (H−1ψ−1Y (x))). Now we notice that the H
−1(x) is nothing but
the first price bid of a bidder facing competition with cdf G = FK−1Y , a bid function we denote by β
I
Y,K . So we conclude
that
hoptimal(x) = max(0, ψY (β
I
Y,K(ψ
−1
Y (x)))) .
Once again the fact that hoptimal is non-decreasing (as a composition of non-decreasing functions) avoids issues related to
ironing.
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D. Notes on learning with splines
A natural question is whether the buyer can compute shading strategies numerically. A first approach is to look back at the
gradient of the bidder’s utility in the direction of a certain function ρ, i.e., the directional derivative, that can be computed by
elementary calculus
∂
∂t
Ui(βt)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= E
({g(β(Xi))[Xi − β(Xi)]} ρ(Xi)1[Xi≥xβ ])
+G(β(xβ))
[
xβf(xβ)
h
′
β(xβ)
− (1− F (xβ))
]
ρ(xβ)
− ρ
′(xβ)xβ(1− F (xβ))G(β(xβ))
h
′
β(xβ)
.
and to look at shading function expressed in a specific basis as
β(x) =
N∑
i=1
ci(β)fi(x) ,
and try to optimize over ci. It would be also quite natural to do an isotonic regression and optimize over non-decreasing
functions directly; this approach is tackled later on.
A natural basis Splines (see e.g. (Hastie et al., 2001) for a practical introduction) are a natural candidate for the function
fi’s. In particular, first order splines are piecewise continuous functions, hence evaluating derivatives is trivial and it is easy
to account in the formula above for the finitely many discontinuities of the derivative that will arise. If ξk’s are given knots,
first order splines are the functions
f1 = 1, f2(x) = x, fk+2(x) = (x− ξk)+ = max(x− ξk, 0) .
Higher order splines could of course also be used.
Lemma 11. As described above, the optimal shading problem can be numerically approximated using steepest descent by a
succession of linear programs, provided the non-decreasing constraint on β can be written linearly in ci. This is of course
the case for 1st order spline.
Proof. After the function is expanded in a basis, the functional gradient becomes a standard gradient, and the shading
function can be improved with a steepest descent. If the reserve value is not one of the knots, the gradient above is easy to
compute: each step of the optimization requires to solve a constrained LP to ensure that the solution is increasing.
For 1st order splines, because the derivative is constant between knots, checking that β′(x) ≥ 0 for all x amounts to checking
finitely many linear constraints and hence is amenable to an LP.
This approach amounts to an exploration of parts of the space of shading functions. Since the objective is not even continuous,
though differentiable in a large part of the parameter space, the optimization problem is hard. In our experiments, we
got significant improvement over bidding truthfully by using the above numerical method. However, we encountered
the discontinuities of the optimization problem described above: our numerical optimizer got stuck at shading functions
around which the reserve value was very unstable, which corresponds to revenue curves for the seller with several distant
(approximate) local maxima: a small perturbation in function space does not induce much loss of the revenue on the seller
side, but can have a huge impact on the reserve value and hence the buyer revenue.
D.1. Some numerical experiments with splines.
This experiment was ran in the case of two bidders with uniform value distribution. The first one is strategic and the second
one is bidding truthfully. We consider the case of a lazy second price auction. The reserve price of the first bidder is
computed based on her bid distribution. We recall that in the case of two bidders bidding truthfully with uniform distribution
and reserve price equal to 0.5, the utility of one bidder is equal to 0.083. We see during the first 100 steps, the optimization
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Figure 3. At the end of gradient descent. Left: Strategy mapping bids to values. Middle: Seller revenue as a function of the
reserve value. Left: Virtual value corresponding of the bid distribution as a function of the value. The reserve value is equal to
0.21 and the reserve price to 0.2. We are in the case of two bidders with uniform distribution. One is strategic and the other one is bidding
truthfully.
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Figure 4. During gradient descent. The seller revenue is flat making the estimation of the objective depending on the reserve value hard
and unstable.
works well and the algorithm finds a strategy with utility around 0.12 which is already a 44% increase compared to the
truthful strategy. Then, optimization is very unstable because seller revenue is flat and the computation of the reserve value
very unstable. This is why we introduce the relaxation that we optimize in the next section.
Compared to our Pytorch code that we introduce in the next section optimizing the relaxation, the gradient descent code is
also very slow because the reserve value is computed by exhaustive search. Having a fully differentiable approach enables
also to adapt it easily to many other different auction mechanisms.
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E. Numerical results with the relaxation and comments on the different strategies
E.1. Comments on the code to reproduce the experiments
To rerun the code, we advise the careful reader to use the notebook notebookStrategiesPytorch.ipynbto see how to compute
the different strategies in the various settings presented in the paper. The code uses Python 3.6 and Pytorch 0.4.1.
E.2. Comparison between the theory and the results of the optimization for the Myerson auction
Figure 5 should be compared with Figure 2. Figure 2 gives the optimal strategy with a strategic bidder with uniform
distribution against 3 other bidders that are bidding truthfully with also a uniform distribution. Figure 5 is the result of the
optimization of
Ui(βi) = E ([Xi − hβi(Xi)]FZ(hβi(Xi))) .
with FZ the cumulative distribution function of Z = max2≤j≤K(0, ψj(Xj)), Xi is the value of bidder i, and hβi =
ψBi(βi(Xi)) is the virtual value function associated with the bid distribution.
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Figure 5. Left:Evolution of the objective during the learning. Middle: Bidding strategy at the end of the training. Right: Virtual value at
the end of the training.The objective correspond to one Myerson auction with three opponents.
E.3. Results on eager second price auction with monopoly reserve prices
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Figure 6. Left:Evolution of the objective during the learning. Middle: Bidding strategy at the end of the training. Right: Virtual value at
the end of the training. The objective correspond to one eager second price auction with three opponents.
According to several papers, the eager second price auction with monopoly price is widely used because it leads to higher
revenue for the seller in practice when facing asymetric bidders. The eager second price auction consists in running a second
price auction but only among bidders that are above their personalized reserve price. The objective function is very similar to
the one of the lazy second price auction except that the winning distribution is different below the reserve price of the other
bidders. Indeed, if all bidders are below their reserve price, the strategic that bids above his monopoly price is sure to win.
The objective we optimize in our code is the following. If we note r the common reserve price of the other bidders, with
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Gi(x) =
∏K
j=2 Fj(r)1[x≤r] +
∏K
j=2 Fj(x)1[x≥r], the objective can be written as
Ur(βi) = E
(
(Xi − hβi(Xi))Gi(β(Xi))1(hβi(Xi) ≥ 0)
)
,
The following figure was derived with assuming a uniform distribution for all bidders.
